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A Connectionist Model of Reflective Reasoning Using Temporal







This paper presents a connectionist model of human
reasoning that uses temporal relations between node
firing. Temporal synchrony is used for representing
variable binding and concepts. Temporal succession serves
to represent rules by linking antecedent to consequent
parts of the rule. The number of successive synchronies i s
affected by two well-known neurobiological parameters,
the frequency of neural rythmic activity and the precision
of neural synchronization. Reasoning is predicted to be
constrained by these variables. An experiment
manipulating the amount of successive synchronies i s
presented. Experimental results would seem to confirm the
predictions.
Introduction
Shastri & Ajjanagadde (1993) described SHRUTI, a
connectionist model of tractable reasoning. They intended to
build a neurally plausible model based mainly on temporal
properties of observed rythmic neural firing patterns in the
brain. Certain neurons tend to oscillate in synchrony at a
frequency of 30 to 80 Hz. (i.e. every 33 to 12 ms). The
model of Shastri & Ajjanagadde used this property in the
attempt to solve the binding problem. Variables and their
respective contents fired in synchrony making appropriate
bindings between roles and fillers. The use of this temporal
property to solve the binding problem was first studied by
Clossman (1988).
Their model is able to draw inferences with great
efficiency. But reasoning is limited to what Shastri &
Ajjanagadde call reflexive reasoning. This concept describes
the type of reasoning that people do effortlessly,
immediately, almost reflexively. It is contrasted with
reflective reasoning, demanding more effort and attention and
taking more time. Deductive reasoning that has been studied
extensively in cognitive psychology pertains to the class of
reflective reasoning. In this paper I will attempt to extend
the properties of Shastri & Ajjanagadde model to allow it to
also handle reflective reasoning. From the model, I will
derive certain  predictions and provide empirical evidence
substantiating these predictions.
There is neurobiological evidence for considering
synchronization as a binding mechanism (Gray & al. 1989,
Singer 1995, Nelson 1995). The interval between two
spikes of a neuron ( p ) is approximately 12 to 33 ms. Inside
this interval a number of different synchronies can occur.
This number is constrained by p  and by w , the width of a
window of synchrony. Nodes that fire within a lag of less









Figure 1: A representation of rhythmic activation and
synchrony. Node B fires in synchrony with node A and node
D fires in synchrony with node C (since the precision is less
than w /2)
The precision of synchronization between neurons has
been reported to be approximately 3 ms. (König & al.,
1995). This means that w  should be around 6 ms. These
values p  and w  limit the number of different possible
synchronies to around 10. This corresponds to the well
known number 7±2, the span of working memory (Miller,
1956, Lisman & Idiart, 1995). Within a particular window
of synchrony, however, numerous concepts can fire at the
same time. The relevant constraint is the length of the chain
of reasoning. As its length increases, the probability for an
error to occur increases.
A good example of reflective reasoning is deduction,
which has been widely studied. Typically subjects take
approximately 5 sec to draw a single deductive inference
(Clark 1969). This delay is far longer than those described
by the Shastri & al. model for reflexive inference. There are
two ways to extend the Shastri & al. model to allow it to
produce these inferences with these delays. Either deductive
reasoning tasks require, a succession of different reflexive
episodes, or they require  learning to initially encode the
problem, followed by the building of an appropriate chain of
reasoning that will link the data to a more abstract rule that
enables inference by appropriate bindings.
The first solution requires an explanation of the nature of
the relationship between successive dynamic bindings. The
second requires a learning algorithm to build a new chain of
reasoning and the presence of abstract knowledge at the end
of the chain of reasoning, for example pragmatic reasoning
schemas (Cheng & Holyoak 1985).
I choose the second solution, which meant including in
the model of Shastri & al. a mechanism for adding windows
of synchrony during the reasoning process. In SHRUTI the
form of the query must contain all windows of synchrony
necessary for a conclusion to be drawn. Deductive reasoning
tasks often require adding new windows of synchrony
because the variables of the conclusion may be bound to a
different content than those of the premises. For example,
consider a conditional reasoning task with a rule: "If Tom
gives a candy to Gus, then Tom has stolen money from
Mary" and a premise: "Tom gives a candy to Gus". In order
to generate the correct conclusion ("Tom has stolen money
from Mary"), "candy" and "money" cannot fire in synchrony,
nor can "Gus" and "Mary". Otherwise there would be
confusion about exactly what is stolen or given and to
whom it is stolen or given.
Shastri & Ajjanagadde (1993) describe a learning
algorithm that enables nodes to fire in synchrony starting
with a noisy temporal firing distribution. Learning is not
only necessary to synchronize firing of appropriate nodes,
but also to link the given rule to a more abstract rule that
enables the generation of the conclusion.
Shastri & Grannes (1995) modified SHRUTI to enable it
to perform negation and detection of inconsistencies. They
added a negative collector node to every predicate. This
option was not chosen in the present model since in their
extension, the negation of each predicate must be
specifically included. This seemed somewhat unrealistic
since negation is a general concept and need not be
specifically associated with each predicate.
The Shastri & al.  model makes use of different kinds of
nodes: fact nodes, collector nodes, enabler nodes, etc.
According to Ajjanagadde (1994) this set of node types, as
well as the distinction between roles and fillers, is
unnecessary. He describes a system that uses a set of
excitatory and inhibitory links, called a link bundle. These
link bundles preserve the qualities of SHRUTI while
simplifying the representation. I adapted this solution to the
present model.
Description of the Model
Network Structure
The network is composed of a set of nodes which are not
fully connected. Each node is either excitatory or inhibitory.
Excitatory nodes can send only excitatory messages, and
inhibitory nodes only inhibitory messages. While excitatory
links bind two nodes, inhibitory links bind a node to a
excitatory connection. This enables a temporary blocking of
a specific excitatory transmission. (figure 2).
Each connection has a weight which has two functions:
determining the probability of transmission of activation,
and, in the event of transmission, the amount of activation
transmitted. Connections also have a length which
determines the delay for the activation to propagate from the










Figure 2: Structure of the net
A node represents a small cluster of neural units (akin to the
Hebbian notion of cell assemblies) and a set of nodes firing
in synchrony represents a concept or a set of bound
concepts. In figure 4 the concept "Consequent" is composed
of 4 nodes and is bound to "Lawrence" because they both fire
in synchrony (figure 3).  In this network architecture, unlike
many connectionist architectures, there is no notion of layer.
Activation Propagation
Excitatory activation is stochastically transmitted along
connections. Connection weights represent the strength of
activation passing and the probability of propagation
through the connections. According to their weight,
connections are stochastically selected. Once selected, the
afferent node receives an activation equal to the value of
weight. If the sum of activations arriving at a node reachs a
threshold, the node fires. Activation propagation along a
connection takes time and the propagation speed is randomly
selected from a particular interval which is modified by the
learning algorithm. Inhibitory activation follows the same
principles, except that activation propagates from nodes to
excitatory connections.
Once a node fires, it tends to fire rhythmically with a
frequency between 30 and 80 Hz (i.e. between 33 and 12
ms). Following Shastri & Ajjanagadde's (1993) notation,
this inter-spike delay is called p . The width of windows of
synchrony last 3 to 6 ms and this value is noted w .
Synchronous firing of nodes either produces variable
binding or associates units that participate in a concept
representation. The temporal sequence of synchronous firing
indicates relations between concepts, enabling the
representation of rules. For example, in figure 3,
"Antecedent" fires before "Consequent" and stands for the
rule: "If Antecedent then Consequent".
Learning
Learning modifies weights and connection delays on the
basis of information from the external world. It is assumed
that facts perceived are composed of a series of concepts. The
activation of these concepts has a particular temporal order.
The task of the learning algorithm is to reproduce this
temporal order and to link concepts to the rest of the
knowledge base. External activation should therefore be
distinguished from internal autonomous activation of the
net. Modification of weights and delays depends on the
overlap of external and internal activation. In the current
model, when activations overlap, the weights of excitatory
connections increase, and the delay intervals shift to focus
around the most recently selected delay duration. In addition,
the weights of connections inhibiting excitatory connections
also decrease. When activations do not overlap the process is
inverted. Delay learning can rapidly focus on a particular
value, enabling nodes to change their partners of synchrony
and therefore permitting plasticity in variable binding.
Predictions of the Model
This model predicts that reasoning will take more time and
be more difficult as the number of synchronies increases.
The number of possible temporal synchronies depends on
the frequency of rhythmic pattern or the inter-spike delay (p )
and the width of windows of synchrony ( w) . When the
number of synchronies increases, the frequency must
decrease (i.e., p  becomes larger) and/or w  must decrease. If
this last value decreases too much, the probability of
confusion between synchronies increases and the probability
of errors increases. In addition, the time for the network to
reach a stable state will increase.
Experiment 1
To test the last prediction we ran a reasoning experiment
comparing two situations. The first situation requires six
windows of synchrony (6 w ), the second requires eight
windows of synchrony (8 w ). Thirty subjects received the
following instructions: "A rule written in blue will appear
on the screen, you must read it and tell me when you have
understood it. Afterward, a statement, written in red will
appear on the screen. You should relate it to the rule and tell
me what you conclude". Subjects were given a series of
similar arithmetic exercises to familiarize them with the
procedure. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the
two groups.
In the first group (6 w ), subjects received this rule: "If Tom
gives a candy to Gus then Tom has given a candy to
Lawrence" and the questions appearing in a random order
were: "Tom gives a candy to Gus", "Tom does not give a
candy to Gus", "Tom has given a candy to Lawrence" and
"Tom has not given a candy to Lawrence". This task of
conditional reasoning makes reference to material
implication. Subjects' inferences are of four types: Modus
Ponens p É q, p
q
, Modus Tollens p É q, ~q
~ p
 (sound inferences)
Denying the antecedent p ” q, ~ p
~q
 and Affirming the consequent
p ” q, q



































































Table 1: instantiation of inferences
Starting with the query: "Tom gives a candy to Gus", the
model predicts a rhythmic pattern with 6 windows of
synchrony that could be represented by figure 3 and a
network state enabling sound inferences as in figure 4. With
6 windows of synchrony, if w  is 3 ms., p  must be ‡  18
ms. (the frequency must be inferior to 56 Hz.); if w  is 6 ms,
p  must be ‡  36 ms. (the frequency must be inferior to 28
Hz.). In figure 3, p  is equal to 24 ms. (42 Hz.) and w  is
equal to 4 ms.
Figure 3: Concepts firing following the query: "Tom gives a
candy to Gus" in the situation 1. Gus and Antecedent are
firing in synchrony as well as Lawrence and Consequent
Connections represented in figure 4 enable sound material
implication inferences. When the premise is "Yes, Tom
gives a candy to Gus", activation is propagated from "Gus"
to "Antecedent",  from "Antecedent" to "Consequent" and
from "Consequent" to "Lawrence". When the premise is
"No, Tom gives a candy to Gus", "No" inhibits the
connection from "Antecedent" to "Consequent" thus prevents
any conclusion. When the premise is "Yes, Tom gives a
candy to Lawrence", "Lawrence" activates "consequent" but
"Yes" inhibits the connection from "Consequent" to
"Antecedent" thus prevents any conclusion. When the
premise is "No, Tom gives a candy to Lawrence" no
inhibition occurs and activation is propagated to enable
"Gus" nodes to fire.
  
Yes
Tom Gives Candy Gus Lawrence
Antecedent Consequent
No
Figure 4: A network configuration that enables sound
infe-rences with regard to material implication. Each
concept is represented by a set of interconnected nodes
although it is not showed. (Note that some nodes could
be used by more than one concept, and that only a small
number of connections are represented). Affirmation and
negation nodes are necessary for sound material
implication inference through inhibition mechanism.
Figure 5: Concepts firing following the query: "Tom gives a
candy to Gus" in the situation 2. Gives and Antecedent are
firing in synchrony as well as Has_stolen and Consequent
For the second group  (8w ), subjects received this rule: "If
Tom gives a candy to Gus then Tom has stolen money from
Mary" and the questions were: "Tom gives a candy to Gus",
"Tom does not give a candy to Gus", "Tom has stolen
money from Mary" and "Tom has not stolen money from
Mary" appearing in a random order. The required 8 windows
of synchrony can be represented as in figure 5 and the state
of the network as in figure 6.  With 8 windows of
synchrony, if w  is 3 ms, p  must be ‡  24 ms. (the frequency
must be inferior to 42 Hz.), if w  is 6 ms, p  must be ‡  48
ms. (the frequency must be inferior to 21 Hz.) which is out
of realistic range. In Figure 5, p  is equal to 28 ms. (36 Hz.)
and w  is equal to 3 ms.
The connections shown in figure 6 enable sound material
implication inferences. For each of the four premises, the
activation is correctly propagated.
Yes




Figure 6: A network configuration that enables sound
inferences with regard to material implication. Each concept
is represented by a set of interconnected nodes although it is
not showed.
Experimentally evaluating the difficulty of the task is not
easy. It is well known that subjects often do not follow
rules related to material implication. In some situations of
everyday life, sound inferences related to material
implication are less adequate than these of material
equivalence. But we cannot separate these types of people in
two groups, those who accept material implication and those
who accept material equivalence. A number of biases affect
subjects responses (Evans 1989). Content and context also
modify the pattern of responses (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985).
To compare the performance between groups, we could
compare response patterns that are sound for material
implication or material equivalence to other types of
patterns. The sound inferences for material implication are
Modus Ponens 
p É q, p
q  and Modus Tollens p É q, ~q
~ p , for material
equivalence, Modus ponens
p ” q, p
q , Denying the antecedent
p ” q, ~ p
~q , Affirming the consequent 
p ” q, q
p  and Modus Tollens
p ” q, ~q
~ p . We compare subjects with consistent responses to
subjects who contradict themselves from one inference to
another.
As the figure 7 shows, the proportion of consistent
patterns of responses is significantly higher in the group
where the presented rule require six windows of synchrony


















Figure 7: Percentage of consistent and inconsistent patterns
of inferences for the two groups.
Even though this criterion measures consistency among
successive inferences, it might be criticized as being simply
a measure of task difficulty. The time taken by subjects to
draw an inference can also be used. The time from the
appearance of the question to the response was recorded,
giving the averages indicated in Table 2.
Group 1 (6 w) Group 2 (8 w)
4894 ms 6528 ms
Table 2: Average time in ms. between the question presen-
tation and the response. Student t (103) = -3.046 p < .005
These data show a highly significant difference between
the two groups. Subjects doing the task requiring eight
windows of synchrony take more time to make an inference
than subjects doing the other task. As predicted, when the
number of windows of synchrony increases, the likelihood
of confusion between synchronies increases, encoding or
learning time increases, and the subject’s response is
delayed.
Psychological data about multiple instantiation tend to
show that people deal more efficiently with a problem in
which predicates are instantiated more than once. For
example, De Soto & al. (1965) showed that subjects make
less errors when inferring “A is better than C” from the
premises “A is better than B” and “B is better than C” than
from the premises “B is better than C” and “B is worse than
A”. My hypothesis involves an abstraction, a replacement of
the multiple premises by a chunked summary that describes
the situation. In this example, the predicate extends the
number of its possible arguments to combine those of
additional instantiated predicates. When it receives the second
premise  “B is better than C” of the first situation, the
system merges the first premise to include C and may
transform a representation “Better than: A, B” to “Better
than: A, B, C”.  The second situation requires an additional
process, that of using the opposite predicate to transform “B
is worse than A” into “A is better than C”.
Experiment 2
The above hypothesis concerning multiple instantiations
was tested experimentally. However, for the moment, the
present model cannot do multiple instantiation. I used two
situations involving the same number of instantiations of
the same predicate, but involving a different number of
transformations in order to make a summarized conclusion.
The first group of subjects received these premises: “Allan is
in love with Mary”, “Mary is in love with Allan”, “Peter is
in love with Barbara”, ”Barbara is in love with Peter”. The
second group received these premises; “Peter is in love with
Mary”, “Barbara is in love with Allan”, “Allan is in love
with Mary” and “Mary is in love with Peter”. The four
premises were presented in a random order to both groups.
After reading these premises, subject had to infer which
people were happy (i.e. where their love was reciprocated). A
higher proportion of subjects gave the correct answer in the
first group where relations are all reciprocal (.92), than in
the second group (.66). Response times were also shorter for
the first group (mean: 3874 ms) than for the second (mean:
10262 ms) Student t (18) = -3.352 p < .005.
These data show that multiple instantiation can be treated
rapidly when only a small number of transformations are
required to get a summarized representation. Subjects are far
less efficient as the number of required transformations
increases. However, there should be a mechanism leading to
a summarized representation that maintains a trace of
previous instantiations while the current instantiations are
active.
Discussion
The present system attempts to model not only certain low-
level neurobiological facts about synchrony of neural firing
but also higher level psychological data on deductive
reasoning. The reader can refer to Shastri &  Ajjanagadde
(1993) for a discussion of the neurobiological plausibility of
this type of model.
We know from Johnson-Laird's work (e.g. Johnson-Laird
& Byrne, 1991) that reasoning is highly constrained by
working memory capacity and we know from Cheng &
Holyoak's work (e.g. Cheng & Holyoak, 1985, Holyoak &
Cheng, 1995) that reasoning is also constrained by
pragmatic principles which are the result of the acquisition
and generalization of knowledge. This model attempts to
incorporate both levels in a single system. Working
memory is conceived as the synchronous and rhythmic firing
of nodes. This process is the consequence of the content of
long term memory since working memory is viewed as the
current activation of long term memory.
The parallel activation of nodes in this model gives it the
theoretical possibility of avoiding problems of
combinatorial explosion in a scaled-up version. This is also
one of the most interesting feature of the Shastri & al.
model (Shastri, 1993). Many of the sequential models of
deductive reasoning have been shown to be intractable in
scaled-up versions (Oaksford & Chater, 1995).
Among the limitations of this model are the problem of
the multiple instantiation and catastrophic forgetting in the
learning process. Multiple instantiation has been treated by
Mani & Shastri (1993). For n instantiations of a concept,
the amount of nodes required in their model is n2. There is
no mechanism in the present model for dealing with
multiple instantiation. But experiment 2 could guide our
research. The number of simultaneous instantiations seems
to be bounded around 2. We could imagine that nodes
pertaining to a doubly instantiated predicate would fire at a
rythm twice as fast as the others. As rythm is bounded by
the refractory period of neurons, multiple instantiation is
also bounded. This hypothesis seems reasonable since the
frequency of oscillations has been found to be dependent on
the amount of activity that a neuron receives.
Catastrophic forgetting is characterized by an interference
of the newly learned content on previously learned
information making this information lost. In my
computational simulation, this limitation means that the
problem must be encoded at the same time as the long term
knowledge is stored. A separation of the architecture into a
"long term memory" component and a "medium term
memory" component might be an effective way of dealing
with this problem (French, 1994).
Conclusions
A good model of human reasoning should explain the
mechanisms by which people solve reasoning problems, the
cause of systematic biases, and how the content of a
problem affects performance. In this paper, I have focused on
a possible low-level mechanism — namely, synchrony —
that enables (and perturbs) deductive reasoning. However, I
did not focus on systematic biases as described in Evans
(1989). It is known that a problem's content affects the
reasoning process. The present model attempts to give an
emergent explanation for this phenomenon, rather than
proposing a specific context-independent mechanism for it,
we could incorporate the Pragmatic Reasoning Schemas
(Cheng & Holyoak, 1985 Holyoak & Cheng, 1995) or
possibly Social Exchange (Cosmides 1989). The model
presented here attempts to combine neurobiological and
psychological plausibility. In addition, experimental data
confirmed a number of predictions of the model.
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